4_THE REALISATIONS OF GRAND PROJETS DEPEND ON EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
The Grands Projets of our case studies are all governed by exceptional bodies and regulations. These become decisive at various stages of project development: in some cases, such as 22@ or King’s Cross, urban redevelopment has only been made possible via special policies and the creation of particular development incentives. In addition, Grands Projets exhibit a dependency on exceptional regulations outside statutory planning procedures, including relaxed planning policies and/or applications. In Shanghai, for example, the central government issued preferential policies for Pudong in 1989 in the form of special economic zones (SEZ), extended in 1992 to allow foreign individuals to invest in Lujiazui.
The Publicly Driven Plans for 22@ were introduced by the City Council of Barcelona in 2000 for the industrial area in the district of St. Martin to allow for the its redevelopment with new programmes and an increased FAR. In King’s Cross, the 2004 London Plan designated 38 Opportunity Areas, which permitted higher densities and special attention at the planning authority level. These specially designated development areas can be compared in status to the Urban Renaissance Areas in Tokyo or even the Vorranggebiete (Special Development Districts) in Hamburg.
The rapid realisation of Grands Projets is frequently coupled with the creation of special governing bodies outside established public ones. The stakeholders behind the new authorities in charge of our cases exhibit various constellations and overlaps of public and/or private actors. Sometimes, local authorities even become developers themselves or form strong alliances with private sectors in order to continue to influence a market-led development, as La Défense and Marina Bay Area both illustrate. Regarding project inclusivity, we found that it is less the public or private nature of these governing bodies that is decisive but more so the extent and control of their power, including, for example, their capacity to select developers or architects, control over design guidelines and right to monitor area access.
While these bodies enable greater stability over time, which extends beyond the four or five years of electoral cycles, accountability for a project becomes increasingly blurred. It can even exist outside the public realm’s influence, with fast-track action plans and development practices that rely on public consultation only when convenient, often via marketing events or questionnaires. For example, HafenCity Hamburg GmbH is a private company owned by the city state of Hamburg; as such, HafenCity Hamburg GmbH has its own governing structure and enjoys great freedom in determining management practices of the HafenCity project. In the case of La Défense, a state-led planning body, the Public Establishment for the Development of the Défense’s Region (EPAD) was created at the beginning of development, which enabled the central government’s exclusive power over local authorities within the project’s site. While EPAD evolved over time and in response to a wider decentralisation of power in France, the project’s initial exclusion of local authorities and communities has held a lasting legacy on La Défense’s insularity and image.
Reference
Any reference to or use of the content present on this page has to be cited as follow: Gasco, Anna, and Naomi C. Hanakata. 2019. ‘The Potential of Grands Projets for Inclusive and Adaptable Future Cities’. In The Grand Projet: Understanding the Making and Impact of Urban Megaprojects, edited by Kees Christiaanse, Anna Gasco, and Naomi C. Hanakata, 603–612. nai 010 Publishers.